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1
Abstract
The purpose of this project is to study the Multi-key Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)
scheme developed by Lo´pez-Alt, Tromer and Vaikuntanathan, which we abbreviate as the
LTV scheme. An FHE scheme is a cryptosystem in which we can evaluate any circuit in
an encrypted form and decrypt the result afterwards. The LTV scheme we studied is based
on NTRU, a public-key cryptosystem using lattice-based cryptography, and it encrypts each
single bit of data into one corresponding polynomial.
This report includes the background research on NTRU encryption scheme, the presentation
of this FHE scheme in a single-key version, and the implementation of it in Sage, an open-
source mathematics tool. The results of this project are a more accessible version of the
original scheme with serious mathematical proofs and a Sage package that implements the
basic scheme and some real-world applications such as an n-bit Adder. The Sage package is
posted in Sage Interact Community website.
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1 Introduction
In the 21st century, computing is not limited to being performed locally on end users’ devices
anymore. It is transforming to a model consisting of services that are provided by servers
at remote locations and delivered in a way similar to traditional utilities such as water,
electricity, and gas [1]. In such a model, end users with light-weight devices such as web
browsers and mobile phones are able to access powerful computing services regardless of the
location of the service host or the manner of delivery. Cloud computing, the most dominant
computing paradigm to realize this utility computing vision, has drawn tremendous attention
from everyone in the world. A survey of 1,650 IT and business executives in 2012 showed
that, on average, more than a third of their current IT budgets are now allocated to cloud
computing [2].
Figure 1: The cloud infrastructure [3]
Cloud computing allows businesses and users to access applications, infrastructure, platforms
from anywhere in the world via any device as long as it is connected to the cloud – the
powerful remote servers (shown in Figure 1). Although cloud computing offers numerous
advantages in various ways, security issues have always been a problem of much debate, since
data stored in the cloud could be vulnerable to unauthorized use by the cloud provider and
even other cloud clients [4]. Therefore, encrypting data that contains sensitive information
before sending it to the cloud is crucial to any cloud user.
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However, imagine the case where we want to use tax preparation software from the cloud.
We would like to perform computations from the cloud, but, certainly, we do not want to
leak the financial numbers involved in computing, which means that we need to encrypt the
data before throwing it in the cloud. Although traditional encryption schemes can make
sure the data is well-secured, it is not hard to see that cloud-based software has little hope of
performing meaningful computations on the data when it is encrypted. This no doubt limits
the great advantage of cloud computing. Is it possible for the cloud to do computations on
inputs in encrypted form while making sure that the result can be decrypted later (shown
in Figure 2)?
Figure 2: Ideal flow when working with the cloud
The answer is yes, with homomorphic encryption. In simple terms, a homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme is a scheme that allows us to perform arbitrary computations on ciphertexts and
decrypt the result afterwards. Let’s start from a very simple encryption scheme, the Caesar
cipher. Here, given a secret key X, we shift every letter to X letters after it in the alphabet.
In our case, we choose X = 13. (When X = 13, this scheme is also called ROT13.) This
scheme is partially homomorphic with respect to the concatenation operation. Below is a
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simple demonstration due to Craig Stuntz [5]:
c1 := Encrypt(“HELLO”, 13) = “URYYB”
c2 := Encrypt(“WORLD”, 13) = “JBEYQ”
c := Concat(c1, c2) = “URYYBJBEYQ”
m := Decrypt(c) = “HELLOWORLD”
As we can see, we are able to perform concatenate operation on the ciphertexts with no need
to decrypt them first. Figure 3 gives us a graphical demonstration of this example.
Figure 3: Homomorphic Concatenation [5]
Ignoring the obvious security concern, the Caesar cipher is a very good example of a partially
homomorphic encryption scheme. Actually, many of the popular encryption schemes are
partially homomorphic with respect to some specific operations. For example, RSA, the
most popular cryptosystem in the world developed by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard
Adleman in 1977 [10], is homomorphic with respect to multiplication. Let’s recall the RSA
scheme. Given a public key (n, e) where n and e are integers, the encryption of a message
m is very simple. The ciphertext c is defined as
c ≡ me (mod n) .
Observe that given two messages m1 and m2, we can generate the ciphertext of their product
by multiplying their ciphertexts together:
(m1)
e · (m2)e = (m1 ·m2)e .
Therefore, RSA is homomorphic with respect to multiplication.
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Up to this point, one might question that it seems homomorphic encryption is very easy to
realize. If we are satisfied with certain encryption scheme with some specific operations (i.e.
partially homomorphic encryption), then it is true that there is not much work for us to
do. However, it is obvious that partially homomorphic encryption schemes are far behind
what is needed in cloud computing, because the reason we perform computations from the
cloud is that those computations tend to be very heavy and complex. Therefore, we need to
develop a homomorphic encryption scheme with universal homomorphic operations, which
means we need to be able to perform any computations we want on the ciphertexts and can
still decrypt the result correctly. Making a partially homomorphic encryption scheme fully
homomorphic or building a brand new fully homomorphic encryption scheme is very hard.
The goal of this project is to present a fully homomorphic encryption scheme developed
by Adriana Lo´pez-Alt, Eran Tromer and Vinod Vaikuntanathan [6] in a single-key version
that is more accessible to non-experts and implement the scheme in Sage, an open-source
mathematics software system based on Python. For simplicity, we denote this encryption
scheme in this paper as the LTV Scheme where “LTV” is the abbreviation of the authors’
names.
2 NTRU Background
In this section, we will look at NTRU encryption scheme, a public-key cryptosystem that
uses ring-based cryptography. This section includes a description of how NTRU works and
a discussion of how it is related to our problem.
2.1 Introduction to NTRU Scheme
The NTRU cryptosystem was developed by Jeffery Hoffstein, Jill Pipher, and Joseph H.
Silverman in 1998 [8]. The most widely used public-key system at the time was RSA, which
is based on the difficulty of factoring large numbers and was created by Rivest, Shamir and
Adleman in 1977. Since we can factor large integers with Shor’s Algorithm in polynomial
time with a quantum computer, people have been concerned about the fact that RSA cryp-
tosystem is quantum-machine vulnerable. The NTRU cryptosystem has many advantages
over RSA including that it cannot be broken by quantum machines and it runs much faster.
Table 1 compares the running time of different operations in RSA and NTRU on a virtual
machine.
The NTRU scheme maps an N -bit binary message to a polynomial of degree N − 1. The
mapping is straightforward. For example, we will map the 8-bit message 00101101 to x5+x3+
x2 + 1. We will perform our operations on such polynomials, but using a special polynomial
8
Operation NTRU (ms) RSA (ms)
Key Generation 9,617 2,090,509
Encryption 515 1505
Decryption 1,132 35,102
Table 1: RSA-NTRU comparison [9]
ring. For better security, we must allow the coefficients of the polynomials to become very
large after encryption. Therefore, each bit of data can be expanded to a large number of
bits, which makes the space complexity of the NTRU scheme very inefficient. We can solve
this problem with NTRU PKCS [8], but we will not discuss it further in this report since it
is not our focus.
2.2 Description of NTRU algorithm
In this section, we will outline how NTRU works, including key generation, encryption and
decryption. We will also study how decryption works with the manipulation of two different
moduli.
2.2.1 Ring Definition
NTRU works over the ring R = Z[x]/〈φ(x)〉 where φ(x) = xn − 1 for some positive integer
n. We need two integers p and q which are co-prime to each other, and it is required that
p  q. Note that p and q are not necessarily primes. The multiplication in this ring is
defined as a cyclic convolution product. Suppose
f =
n−1∑
i=0
fix
i ∈ R and g =
n−1∑
i=0
gix
i ∈ R ,
then we have the product
h = f · g =
n−1∑
k=0
hkx
k ∈ R
where
hk =
∑
i+j≡k (mod n)
figj .
This is the same as multiplying f and g in Z[x], and then reduce the result modulo φ(x).
For example, let
φ(x) = x4 − 1
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and let
f = 2x2 + 2x+ 2 g = 2x3 + x2 .
Then we have
h = f · g
= (2x2 + 2x+ 2)(2x3 + x2) (mod φ(x))
= 4x5 + 6x4 + 6x3 + 2x2 (mod φ(x))
= 6x3 + 2x2 + 4x+ 6 .
Also note that when we reduce a polynomial modulo q, we mean to reduce every coefficient
of this polynomial modulo q. For example, for f and g as defined earlier, we have
h = f · g (mod 5)
= 6x3 + 2x2 + 4x+ 6 (mod 5)
= x3 + 2x2 + 4x+ 1 .
Finally, let’s define two kinds of norms used in this report.
Definition 2.1 (Infinity Norm). For any polynomial f =
∑n
i=0 cix
i, the infinity norm is
defined as the maximum of the absolute values of its coefficients:
‖f‖∞ = max{|c0|, |c1|, . . . , |cn|} .
Definition 2.2 (One Norm). For any polynomial f =
∑n
i=0 cix
i, the one norm is defined as
the sum of the absolute values of its coefficients:
‖f‖ = ‖f‖1 =
n∑
i=0
|ci| .
2.2.2 Key Generation
Let f and g be two random polynomials in the ring R. We need to make sure that f has
inverses both modulo q and modulo p. We will denote these inverses by fq and fp respectively.
Then we have
fq · f ≡ 1 (mod q) and fp · f ≡ 1 (mod p) .
Hoffstein, Phpher and Silverman state that for suitable parameter choices, these inverses
of f exist for most choices of f [8]. We can find inverses using the Extended Euclidean
Algorithm. For a review of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm, please refer to Section 5.1.2.
Then we define our public key as
pk := h = fq · g (mod q)
and our secret key as
sk := f .
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2.2.3 Encryption
Given a message m ∈ R where every coefficient of m is either 0 or 1 representing an n-bit
message, we generate a random polynomial s, and then compute
c = ps · h+m (mod q)
where p is the small prime chosen above. We output c as the ciphertext.
2.2.4 Decryption
To decrypt a ciphertext c with a private key f , we first compute
µ = f · c (mod q)
where we reduce the coefficients of µ to lie in the range (− q
2
, q
2
]. Then we compute
m′ = fp · µ (mod p)
as our decrypted message.
2.2.5 Why Decryption Works
The polynomial µ satisfies
µ = f · c (mod q)
= f · (ps · h+m) (mod q)
= pf · s · h+ f ·m (mod q)
= pf · s · (fq · g) + f ·m (mod q)
= pg · s · (fq · f) + f ·m (mod q)
= pg · s · 1 + f ·m (mod q)
= pg · s+ f ·m (mod q) .
If we can guarantee that every coefficient of the polynomial pg · s+ f ·m lies within (− q
2
, q
2
],
then it is equal to its image modulo q. It is possible to control the size of ‖pg · s+ f ·m‖∞
because every term in this expression is controllable, in that it is composed of terms that we
sample from a well-chosen distributions. By contrast, fp and fq are not controllable because
they are computed rather than sampled. Therefore, we have
µ = pg · s+ f ·m ∈ R .
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Reducing this polynomial modulo p will get rid of (pg · s) and leave us with
µ mod p = f ·m (mod p) .
Multiplying it by fp gives us the original message m because
fp · f ≡ 1 (mod p) .
Keep in mind that we are assuming every coefficient of the polynomial pg ·s+f ·m lies within
[− q
2
, q
2
). If this condition does not hold, we are having what we call a wrap-arround error
which leads to failure in decryption. Since this project is not focused on NTRU cryptosystem,
we will not discuss wrap-arround error in detail here. The problem of wrap-around error will
appear again later in this paper in the LTV scheme, and we will analyze it in detail then.
2.3 Homomorphic Properties
Now let’s look at the homomorphic properties that exist in the NTRU scheme. Is NTRU
scheme homomorphic with respect to any operation? Suppose we have two ciphertexts c1
and c2 as encryptions of the original messages m1 and m2 with the same private key f .
Let n, R, p and q be as defined earlier. Let’s consider two operations here: addition and
multiplication.
2.3.1 Addition
First, we add the two ciphertexts:
cadd = c1 + c2 .
Then we try to decrypt this sum by computing
µ = f · cadd (mod q)
= f · (c1 + c2) (mod q)
= f · c1 + f · c2 (mod q)
= ps1 · g + f ·m1 + ps2 · g + f ·m2 (mod q) .
With appropriate parameter choices, we can make sure that
‖ps1 · g + f ·m1 + ps2 · g + f ·m2‖∞ ≤ q
2
,
which means we recover exactly the same polynomial after reduction modulo q. Then we
can compute
µ mod p = f ·m1 + f ·m2 (mod p) .
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Multiplying it by fp gives us
madd = fp · f ·m1 + fp · f ·m2 (mod p)
= m1 +m2 .
Thus, we know that NTRU scheme is additively homomorphic assuming that the parameter
choices are appropriate, i.e. without wrap-around error. Considering that each message
represents a binary sequence, this operation gives us a bitwise XOR if we reduce the result
modulo 2. However, the hardship to avoid wrap-around error grows linearly; thus, it is
impossible for us to guarantee decryption works after an arbitrary number of additions.
Such a scheme is denoted as somewhat homomorphic.
2.3.2 Multiplication
First, we multiply the two ciphertexts:
cmult = c1 · c2 .
Then we expand cmult as
cmult = c1 · c2
= (ps1 · h+m1) · (ps2 · h+m2)
= (ps1 · fq · g +m1) · (ps2 · fq · g +m2) .
In order to eliminate the uncontrollable term fq, we need to multiply it by f twice, which
gives us
f 2 · cmult = (ps1 · g + f ·m1) · (ps2 · g + f ·m2) (mod q)
= p2s1 · s2 · g2 + ps1 · g · f ·m2 + ps2 · g · f ·m1 + f 2 ·m1 ·m2
Again, if we can avoid wrap-around error, then we can decrypt the result by first reducing it
modulo p and then multiplying it by f 2p . However, this homomorphic multiplication (cyclic
convolution product) does not mean anything to us since the operands are encryptions of
binary sequences. Also, notice that the hardship to avoid wrap-around error grows expo-
nentially, and we have to keep track of how many multiplications by f and fp we need to
perform.
Besides these disadvantages, consider the case when we need to decrypt a combination of
addition and multiplication of the ciphertexts. For example, if we want to decrypt c1+c2 ·c3,
multiplying it by either f or f 2 will give us a wrong result. Therefore, NTRU is far from a
fully homomorphic encryption system but is close to a somewhat homomorphic encryption
system. What can we do to improve it?
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3 Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Based on NTRU
In this section, we will study the LTV cryptosystem as a somewhat homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme based on NTRU and discuss the homomorphic properties of two operations in
this scheme: addition and multiplication. We will outline a transition from a somewhat
homomorphic scheme to a fully homomorphic one in Section 4.
3.1 The Scheme
This section introduces the basic operations of a somewhat homomorphic version of the
LTV scheme including key generation, encryption and decryption. We will also discuss
wrap-around error in detail and how this version of the scheme is somewhat homomorphic.
3.1.1 Key Generation
Let φ(x) = xn + 1 for some n ∈ N and q be a prime number. Let R = Z[x]/〈φ(x)〉 and
Rq = R/qR, the quotient ring obtained by reducing modulo the ideal qR of all polynomials
whose coefficients are multiples of q. Converting a polynomial in R to a polynomial in Rq
works in the same way as reducing every coefficient of the polynomial modulo q which is
shown in the discussion of NTRU. Note that Rq ≡ Zq[x]/〈φ(x)〉, where φ is now viewed as
an element of Zq[x].
Definition 3.1 (B-Bounded Polynomial [6]). A polynomial f ∈ R is called B-Bounded if
‖f‖∞ ≤ B.
Let B ∈ Z and let f ′, g be two B-bounded polynomials in Rq. Set f = 2f ′ + 1 so that
f ≡ 1 (mod 2) .
If f is not invertible in Rq, resample f
′. Then we can define our public key as
pk := h = 2gf−1 ∈ Rq
and our secret key as
sk := f ∈ Rq .
Of course, if f−1 is made public, an attacker can find f . The designers use g as a mask and
multiply by two to make this mask ”removable” even though h will not typically have all
even coefficients.
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3.1.2 Encryption
We encrypt the message bit by bit in the LTV scheme unlike encrypting a string of bits all
together in the NTRU scheme. Given a single-bit message m ∈ {0, 1}. Let s, e be arbitrary
B-bounded polynomials in Rq. We generate our ciphertext as
c := hs+ 2e+m ∈ Rq
where h is the public key.
3.1.3 Decryption
Given a ciphertext c and a secret key f , we can decrypt the ciphertext by computing
µ := fc ∈ Rq .
We then compute
m′ := µ (mod 2) .
Finally, we output m′ as the decrypted message.
3.2 Proof of Correctness
In this section, we will discuss why decryption works in the LTV scheme as well as details
about wrap-around error, including how wrap-around error occurs and how to avoid it.
3.2.1 Observation
First, let’s define a new variable
µ¯ := 2gs+ 2fe+ fm ∈ R .
Then we can easily show
µ¯ mod 2 = fm mod 2
= 2f ′m+m mod 2
= m .
If we can prove that µ¯ = µ (mod q) is always true, then if ‖µ¯‖∞ ≤ q2 , we can always shift
the coefficients of µ into the interval (− q
2
, q
2
) to get µ¯. Thus, it is guaranteed that we can
recover m from µ¯. In fact, if we can make sure all coefficients of µ¯ stay in [a, a + q) for
some a ∈ Z, we can recover µ¯ by shifting the coefficients of µ to that interval. Otherwise,
we cannot be sure to decrypt the correct message, because we cannot guarantee the result
from shifting the coefficients of µ is unique. We denote this as a wrap-around error.
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3.2.2 Relations in the Rings
Lemma 3.2 (Order of Reductions). Given φ(x) = xn + 1 for some n ∈ N, and some prime
q, for any f ∈ Z[x], we have
f mod φ(x) ≡ (f mod q) mod φ(x) (mod q)
Proof. Let
f := c0 + c1x+ c2x
2 + . . .+ cnx
n + . . .
be an arbitrary element in Z[x]. Then let
fq := f mod q = r0 + r1x+ r2x
2 + . . .+ rnx
n + . . .
where for all i ∈ {0} ∪ N, ri ≡ ci (mod q).
Next, define
f˜ := f mod φ(x) = (c0−cn + c2n − c3n + . . .)+
(c1 − cn+1 + c2n+1 − c3n+1 + . . .)x+
(c2 − cn+2 + c2n+2 − c3n+2 + . . .)x2+
. . .
(cn−1 − c2n−1 + c3n−1 − c4n−1 + . . .)xn−1 ,
and define
f˜q := fq mod φ(x) = (r0−rn + r2n − r3n + . . .)+
(r1 − rn+1 + r2n+1 − r3n+1 + . . .)x+
(r2 − rn+2 + r2n+2 − r3n+2 + . . .)x2+
. . .
(rn−1 − r2n−1 + r3n−1 − r4n−1 + . . .)xn−1 .
We need to show that
f˜ ≡ f˜q (mod q) .
We know that for all i ∈ {0} ∪ N,
ri ≡ ci (mod q) .
Since every coefficient of xi in f˜ is a linear combination of c1, c2, c3 . . ., and every coefficient
of xi in f˜q is a linear combination of r1, r2, r3 . . . with the same operations, we have
f˜ ≡ f˜q (mod q) .
With Lemma 3.2, it is not hard to see it is always true that µ¯ = µ (mod q), which guarantees
a successful decryption if there is no wrap-around error.
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3.2.3 Variable Range
Now let’s discuss how to choose variables to guarantee that there is no wrap-around error.
Lemma 3.3 (Product Bound [6]). Let n ∈ N, let φ(x) = xn + 1, and let R = Z[x]/〈φ(x)〉.
For any s, t ∈ R,
‖s · t mod φ(x)‖ ≤ √n · ‖s‖ · ‖t‖
‖s · t mod φ(x)‖∞ ≤ n · ‖s‖∞ · ‖t‖∞
Let every symbol be as defined in the basic scheme. Lemma 3.3 gives us
‖fe‖∞ ≤ n(2B + 1)B ,
‖gs‖∞ ≤ nB2 ,
‖µ¯‖∞ ≤ 2n(2B + 1)B + 2nB2 + 2B + 1
= 6nB2 + 2nB + 2B + 1 .
Below are the situations with some specific values of B.
For B = 1,
‖µ¯‖∞ ≤ 6n+ 2n+ 2 + 1
≤ 8n+ 3
For B = 2,
‖µ¯‖∞ ≤ 24n+ 4n+ 4 + 1
≤ 28n+ 5
For B very large, (B ≥ 5)
nB2 ≥ 5nB
≥ 2nB + 2B + 1
‖µ¯‖∞ ≤ 6nB2 + nB2
= 7nB2
We need to choose the prime q large enough to guarantee that
q
2
> ‖µ¯‖∞ .
From now on, we will denote ‖µ¯‖∞ as the wrap-around error term since it is the value we
need to control.
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3.2.4 Simple Wrap-around Example
To more clearly explain how wrap-around error occurs, let’s look at a simple example.
Choose variables
Let n = 4 such that φ(x) = x4 + 1.
Let q = 7, B = 1. (Notice that q is smaller than 16n+ 6 = 70, the minimum value of q that
guarantees no wrap-around.)
Let f ′ = x2 − 1 such that f = 2f ′ + 1 = 2x2 − 1.
Let g = x2 + x.
Key generation
First, let’s find f−1 using Extended Euclidean Algorithm:
[x4 + 1] = [2x2 − 1](4x2 + 2) + 3
[2x2 + 1] = [3](3x2 + 2) + 0
gcd(x4 + 1, 2x2 − 1) = 3
Therefore,
3 = [x4 + 1]− (4x2 + 2)[2x2 − 1] .
Since
1 ≡ 3 · 5 (mod 7) ,
we have
1 = 5[x4 + 1]− (20x2 + 10)[2x2 − 1] .
Hence,
f−1 = −20x2 − 10
= x2 − 3 .
Then let’s find the public key by computing
h = 2f−1g
= 2(x2 − 3)(x2 + x)
= 2x3 + x2 + x− 2 .
The secret key is
f = 2x2 − 1 .
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Encryption
Suppose s = x3 + x+ 1, e = x3, m = 1. We can generate the ciphertext as
c = hs+ 2e+m ,
where
hs = (2x3 + x2 + x− 2)(x3 + x+ 1)
= 2x6 + x5 + 3x4 + x3 + 2x2 − x− 2
= x3 − 2x+ 2 ,
and
2e = 2x3 .
Thus,
c = 3x3 − 2x+ 3
Decryption
Now we try to decrypt by computing
µ = fc = (2x2 − 1)(3x3 − 2x+ 3)
= 6x5 + 7x3 + 6x2 + 2x− 3
= −x2 + 3x− 3 .
We then have
µ mod 2 = x2 + x+ 1 6= m .
Analysis
Let
µ¯ = 2gs+ 2fe+ fm ∈ R ,
then we can easily show
µ¯ mod 2 = m .
In this case,
gs = (x2 + x)(x3 + x+ 1)
= x5 + x4 + x3 + 2x2 + x
= x3 + 2x2 − 1 ,
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fe = (2x2 − 1)x3
= 2x5 − x3
= −x3 − 2x .
Thus,
µ¯ = 2x3 + 4x2 − 2 + 2x3 − 4x+ 2x2 − 1
= 6x2 − 4x− 3
and
µ¯ mod 2 = 1
= m .
Notice that
µ¯ = 6x2 − 4x− 3 and µ = −x2 + 3x− 3 ,
so
µ¯ ≡ µ (mod 7) .
We cannot recover µ¯ from µ because a wrap-around error has occurred as both 6x2 and −4x
in µ¯ are out of bound.
3.3 Homomorphic Properties
Now let’s see why this scheme is somewhat homomorphic. Let c1 and c2 be two ciphertexts,
being encryptions of messages m1 and m2 with the same secret key f .
3.3.1 Addition
Define the sum of two ciphertexts as
cadd = c1 + c2 .
Then, as long as there is no wrap-around error, we have
f · cadd mod 2 = f · (c1 + c2) (mod 2)
= f · c1 + f · c2 (mod 2)
= µ1 + µ2 (mod 2)
= m1 +m2 (mod 2) .
As we have seen above, we are able to decrypt the sum of the two ciphertexts to recover the
sum of the two messages. Note that the modulo 2 sum of the two bits is the XOR gate in
circuit design.
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3.3.2 Multiplication
Define the product of two ciphertexts as
cmult = c1 · c2 .
Again, as long as there is no wrap-around error, we have
f 2 · cmult mod 2 = f 2 · (c1 · c2) (mod 2)
= (f · c1) · (f · c2) (mod 2)
= µ1 · µ2 (mod 2)
= m1 ·m2 (mod 2)
= m1 ·m2 .
As we have seen above, we are able to decrypt the product of the two ciphertext to recover
the product of the two messages. Note that the product of the two bits is the AND gate in
circuit design.
3.3.3 Combination of Addition and Multiplication
Recall that in the NTRU scheme, we are not able to decrypt the ciphertext after a combi-
nation of addition and multiplication. However, in the LTV scheme, since
f ≡ 1 (mod 2) ,
we know that as long as there is no wrap-around error, it is true that
fkm mod 2 = m
where f is the secret key, m is the message and k is any positive integer. This gives us
the power to decrypt a combination of additions and multiplications via multiplying the
result ciphertext by fk where f is the secret key and k is the depth of the longest chain of
multiplications. This is one of the most significant improvements from the NTRU scheme
to the LTV scheme, which makes the LTV scheme somewhat homomorphic.
3.3.4 Wrap-around Error Term Growth
First, define µ¯1 and µ¯2 as
µ¯1 = 2gs1 + 2fe1 + fm1
µ¯2 = 2gs2 + 2fe2 + fm2 .
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For addition, we need to control the growth of ‖µ¯1 + µ¯2‖∞ in order to recover µ¯1 + µ¯2 from
µ1 + µ2. Therefore, the wrap-around error term grows linearly.
For multiplication, we need to control the growth of ‖µ¯1 · µ¯2‖∞ in order to recover µ¯1 · µ¯2
from µ1 · µ2. Therefore, the wrap-around error term grows exponentially.
4 From Somewhat to Fully Homomorphic Encryption
In this section, we will talk about how to convert this somewhat homomorphic LTV scheme
to a fully homomorphic one. We will apply Gentry’s bootstrapping Theorem [6], but in order
to do this, we must first apply two techniques: Relinearization and Modulus Reduction.
4.1 Relinearization
In the somewhat homomorphic LTV scheme as well as in the earlier NTRU scheme, we
notice that in order to decrypt a product of k ciphertexts, we need to multiply the product
ciphertext by the secret key k times. This requires us to keep track of the depth of the circuit
we are evaluating, which tends to be very hard if the circuit is complex. Relinearization
enables us to decrypt any combination of additions and multiplications of the ciphertexts by
multiplying the resulting ciphertext by the secret key for one single time. We can achieve
this by introducing an evaluation key.
4.1.1 Key Generation
Let φ(x) = xn + 1 for some n ∈ N and q be a prime number. Let R = Z[x]/〈φ(x)〉 and
Rq = R/qR. Let B ∈ Z+ and let f ′, g be two B-bounded polynomials in Rq. Set f = 2f ′+1.
If f is not invertible in Rq, resample f
′. Then we can define our public key as
pk := h = 2gf−1 ∈ Rq .
Our secret key is defined as
sk := f ∈ Rq .
Let ` = blog qc. (Notice that this is a base-2 logarithm.) For all τ ∈ {0, . . . , `}, let sτ , eτ be
arbitrary B-bounded polynomials in Rq, and compute
γτ := hsτ + 2eτ + 2
τf ∈ Rq .
This can be viewed as an encryption of f , shifted by τ bits. Our evaluation key is
ek := (γ0, . . . , γ`) ∈ R`+1q .
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4.1.2 Encryption
To encrypt a single-bit message m ∈ {0, 1}, we sample arbitrary B-bounded polynomials s,
e from Rq. We then generate our ciphertext as
c := hs+ 2e+m ∈ Rq .
4.1.3 Decryption
Given a ciphertext c and a secret key f , we can decrypt the ciphertext by computing
µ := fc ∈ Rq .
We then compute
m′ := µ (mod 2) .
Finally, we output m′ as the decrypted message.
4.1.4 Evaluation
We can add two ciphertexts normally because we can always decrypt the sum of two cipher-
text by multiplying the secret key only once. See Section 3.3.1.
When we multiply two ciphertexts c1 and c2, let
c := c1 · c2 ∈ Rq .
Then find the binary representation of c by generating c˜τ such that
c =
∑`
τ=0
c˜τ2
τ .
Finally, output ciphertext as
cmult =
∑`
τ=0
c˜τγτ
where γτ is from the evaluation key.
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4.1.5 Binary Representation Example
To avoid confusion, let’s look at a concrete example that shows how to find the binary
representation of a ciphertext c.
Suppose c = 5x3 − 3x2 + 4 in the ring R = Z11[x]/〈x4 + 1〉. Then we know that
` = blog 11c = 3 .
Next, we need to convert every coefficient to its binary form as shown in Table 2.
Decimal Form Binary Form
5 0101
8 1000
0 0000
4 0100
Table 2: Coefficients of c in Binary
Notice that here we convert negative coefficients to their corresponding positive values, e.g.
−3 ≡ 8 (mod 11). The reason for this conversion is that computers process integers in their
binary form. For positive integers, we are able to use their binary forms directly. However,
we cannot use the binary forms of negative integers because most modern computers use
two’s complement to represent signed integers, which does not work mathematically here.
For each τ ∈ {0, . . . , `}, we generate a polynomial c˜τ based on the bit at position τ of the
binaries, where 0 corresponds to the least significant bit (LSB) and ` corresponds to the
most significant bit (MSB). In our example here, for τ = 0, c˜0 = x
3 because the coefficient
of x3 has the LSB equal to 1, while the other coefficients have the LSB equal to 0. Below is
the complete binary representation of our polynomial c.
c˜0 = x
3
c˜1 = 0
c˜2 = x
3 + 1
c˜3 = x
2
It easy to show that
c =
3∑
τ=0
c˜τ2
τ .
4.1.6 How does it work
Recall that the purpose of relinearization is to decrypt a product ciphertext via multiplying
it by the secret key only once.
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Suppose cmult is the ciphertext that we generate with evaluation process. Then
cmult =
∑`
τ=0
c˜τγτ
and
c = c1c2 =
∑`
τ=0
c˜τ2
τ .
Since γτ = hsτ + 2eτ + 2
τf , we have
cmult =
∑`
τ=0
c˜τ (hsτ + 2eτ + 2
τf)
= h
∑`
τ=0
c˜τsτ + 2
∑`
τ=0
c˜τeτ + f
∑`
τ=0
c˜τ2
τ
= h
∑`
τ=0
c˜τsτ + 2
∑`
τ=0
c˜τeτ + fc
= hs′ + 2e′ + fc0
for the obvious choice of s′ and e′.
Therefore, when we decrypt, we have
fcmult = fhs
′ + 2fe′ + f 2c
= 2gs′ + 2fe′ + (fc1)(fc2)
= m1m2 (mod 2) .
Thus, as long as we can control the wrap-around error, we can decrypt the ciphertext with
only one multiplication by the secret key.
4.1.7 Error Growth
Although relinearization significantly simplifies our decryption process, we are able to find
that it however adds to the wrap-around error term. We have from above
fcmult = 2gs
′ + 2fe′ + (fc1)(fc2)
= 2g
∑`
τ=0
c˜τsτ + 2f
∑`
τ=0
c˜τeτ + (fc1)(fc2) .
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From Lemma 3.3, we know that
‖c˜τsτ‖∞ ≤ nB
‖c˜τeτ‖∞ ≤ nB .
Thus, we have
‖2g
∑`
τ=0
c˜τsτ + 2f
∑`
τ=0
c˜τeτ‖∞ ≤ 2nB(`+ 1)nB + 2n(2B + 1)(`+ 1)nB
= 6n2B2(`+ 1) + 2n2B(`+ 1)
≤ 8n2B2(`+ 1) .
Therefore, we have shown that relinearization adds 8n2B2(`+1) to the original wrap-around
error term. Assume B = 1, then relinearization adds 8n2`+ 8n2 to the original wrap-around
error term which is 17n3.
4.2 Modulus Reduction
Modulus reduction is a noise-management technique which provides an exponential gain
on the depth of the circuit that can be evaluated. It allows us to keep the wrap-around
error term small by scaling the ciphertext after each operation. This section includes why
modulus reduction benefits us, how modulus reduction changes the scheme and why modulus
reduction works mathematically.
4.2.1 The Idea of Modulus Reduction
The process of modulus reduction is surprisingly simple. Let qi and qi+1 < qi be primes and
let c(x) be a polynomial with small coefficients. We simply transform c(x) to a polynomial
c′(x) which is a rounded version of qi+1
qi
c(x) whose coefficients have the same parity as those
of c(x). So
c′(x) ∈ Rqi+1 when c(x) ∈ Rqi .
After this operation, the wrap-around error term of the ciphertext is scaled by the same
factor,
qj
qi
. How can this benefit us?
For example, suppose we have a 100-bit prime number q0 as the first modulus and a 90-bit
prime number q1 as the second modulus. That is
q0 ≈ 2100 and q1 ≈ 290
Suppose the wrap-around error term we have is 15-bit, then after modulus reduction, since
we have decreased the moduli by a factor of 210, we also decrease the wrap-around error
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term by the same factor, which means we are left with a roughly 5-bit wrap-around error
term. Denote the wrap-around error term by e0 and e1. We have
e0 ≈ 215 and e1 ≈ 25
Suppose we need to make sure that the wrap-around error term is at most a quarter of the
modulus. If we have 7 polynomials in Rq0 with wrap-around error terms approximately equal
to 215, multiplying them altogether will give us a new wrap-around error term of the order
2105, which is certainly out of bound.
However, if we multiply the 7 polynomials after modulus reduction, the new wrap-around
error term is only 235, far away from our upper limit of 290/4.
From this simple example, we can see that modulus reduction is very beneficial. Apply it
repeatedly will significantly improve the maximum depth of the circuit that can be evaluated.
In the following sections, let’s look at the improved scheme using modulus reduction.
4.2.2 Key Generation
Let φ(x) = xn + 1 for some n ∈ N and let R = Z[x]/〈φ(x)〉. We need to sample a ladder of
decreasing moduli q0, q1, . . . , qddec where ddec is the depth of the circuit we want to evaluate.
Let B  qddec ∈ Z.
For every i ∈ {0, . . . , ddec}, sample g(i), u(i) as B-Bounded polynomials and set f (i) := 2u(i) +
1. If f (i) is not invertible in Rqi , resample u
(i). Let h(i) := 2g(i)
(
f (i)
)−1 ∈ Rqi−1 , and set
pk := h(0) ∈ Rq0 and sk := f (ddec) ∈ Rqddec .
For all i ∈ [ddec] := {1, 2, . . . , ddec}, and τ ∈ {0, . . . , blog qi−1c}, sample s(i)τ , e(i)τ as B-bounded
polynomials and compute
γ(i)τ := h
(i)s(i)τ + 2e
(i)
τ + 2
τf (i−1) ∈ Rqi−1
ζ(i)τ := h
(i)s(i)τ + 2e
(i)
τ + 2
τ
(
f (i−1)
)2 ∈ Rqi−1 .
Set
ek :=
{
γ(i)τ , ζ
(i)
τ
}
i∈[ddec],τ∈{0,...,blog qic} .
4.2.3 Encryption
Given a single bit message m ∈ {0, 1}. Let s, e be arbitrary B-bounded polynomials. We
can generate our ciphertext as
c := hs+ 2e+m ∈ Rq0 .
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4.2.4 Decryption
Given a ciphertext c ∈ Rqddec and a secret key sk = f (ddec), we can decrypt the ciphertext by
computing
µ := f (ddec)c ∈ Rq .
We then compute
m′ := µ (mod 2) .
Finally, we output m′ as the decrypted message.
4.2.5 Evaluation
We show how to evaluate a t-input circuit C where all inputs ci are encrypted with the same
public key/private key pair (pk, sk) having corresponding evaluation key ek, which is also
publicly available. A cloud server needs not just pk but also ek to perform the computa-
tions. We assume without loss of generality that the circuit C is leveled; i.e., it is composed
of alternating XOR and AND levels. We show how to homomorphically add and multiply
two ciphertexts below.
Addition
Given two ciphertexts c1, c2 ∈ Rqi , compute c = c1 + c2. For τ ∈ {0, . . . , blog qic}, define c˜τ
so that
c =
blog qic∑
τ=0
2τ c˜τ .
Then we define
c˜ :=
blog qic∑
τ=0
c˜τγ
(i)
τ ∈ Rqi .
Finally, we reduce the modulus. Let cadd be the polynomial with integer coefficients which is
closest to
(
qi+1
qi
)
c˜ subject to the condition that, coefficient-wise, cadd ≡ c˜ (mod 2). Output
cadd ∈ Rqi+1 as an encryption of the sum of the underlying messages.
Multiplication
Given two ciphertexts c1, c2 ∈ Rqi , compute c = c1 · c2. For τ ∈ {0, . . . , blog qic}, define
c˜τ so that
c =
blog qic∑
τ=0
2τ c˜τ .
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Then we define
c˜ :=
blog qic∑
τ=0
c˜τζ
(i+1)
τ ∈ Rqi .
Finally, we reduce the modulus. Let cmult be the polynomial with integer coefficients closest
to
(
qi+1
qi
)
c˜ such that cmult ≡ c˜ (mod 2). Output cmult ∈ Rqi+1 as an encryption of the product
of the underlying messages.
Observe: if our circuit is leveled, we only need γ
(i)
τ for i even and ζ
(i)
τ for i odd.
4.2.6 Proof of Modulus Reduction
Lemma 4.1 (Modulus Reduction). Let q0 and q1 be two odd moduli and let c ∈ Zn. Let
c′ ∈ Zn be the vector closest to q1
q0
c satisfying
c′i ≡ ci (mod 2) for all i.
Then for any f ∈ Zn, with |fc mod q0| < q02 − q0q1‖f‖1, we have
|fc′ mod q1| ≡ |fc mod q0| (mod 2) ,
and
|fc′ mod q1| < q1
q0
|fc mod q0|+ ‖f‖1 .
Proof. We can write
fc mod q0 = fc− kq0
for some k ∈ Z. Define n1 = fc′ − kq1. We have
c ≡ c′ (mod 2) ,
qo ≡ q1 (mod 2) .
Hence,
fc mod q0 ≡ n1 (mod 2) .
Thus,
|fc mod q0| ≡ |n1| (mod 2) .
We need to prove that
n1 = fc
′ mod q1 .
Since
fc = fc mod q0 + kq0 ,
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we have
q1
q0
fc =
q1
q0
(fc mod q0) + kq1 .
Therefore, we may write
n1 = fc
′ − kq1
=
q1
q0
(fc mod q0) + fc
′ − q1
q0
(fc)
=
q1
q0
(fc mod q0) + fd (for d = c
′ − q1
q0
c) .
Since all entries of d lie in [−1, 1], we know
|fd| < ‖f‖ .
Thus,
n1 <
q1
q0
(fc mod q0) + ‖f‖ .
By hypothesis,
|fc mod q0| < q0
2
− q0
q1
‖f‖
q1
q0
|fc mod q0| < q1
2
− ‖f‖
|n1| < q1
2
.
This shows that n1 is closer to zero than any other integer in the form fc
′ − lq1. So
n1 = fc
′ mod q1
and
|fc′ mod q1| < q1
q0
|fc mod q0|+ ‖f‖
Lemma 4.1 shows us that we can recover the same message in two different rings after
modulus reduction.
5 Implementation of the Scheme
In this section, we will discuss the implementation of the LTV homomorphic encryption
scheme in Sage and some advanced circuits built using this scheme.
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Sage is a free open-source mathematics software system licensed under the GPL. It combines
the power of many existing open-source packages into a common Python-based interface [7].
Sage supports on-line worksheets and can also be installed locally wrapped in a Linux virtual
machine. Figure 4 is a screenshot of a Sage worksheet GUI.
Figure 4: Sage worksheet
Since Sage is Python-based, it follows the syntax in Python and supports all the built-in
data structures in Python such as lists and hashtables, which can be very useful. How-
ever, it is tricky that an integer in Sage is by default an integer in a Sage-specific package
(sage.rings.integer.Integer) instead of a Python integer. Sometimes we need to perform con-
versions back and forth to avoid errors.
The Sage implementation developed in this project has been posted in Sage Interact Com-
munity website.
5.1 Inverse in Ring Rq
In order to generate the public key, we need to find the inverse of the secret key in the ring
Rq. Recall that
R = Z[x]/〈φ(x)〉 and Rq = R/qR .
Since the ring Rq is not a commonly used ring, Sage does not support the environmental
declaration of it. Although Sage supports the declaration of the ring R, it causes unexpected
errors in later computations. Thus, we need to manually manipulate the additions and the
multiplications in Rq. The manipulation of those operations is fairly straightforward, but it
is not trivial to find the inverse of a polynomial, in our case, the inverse of the secret key.
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5.1.1 Using System of Equations
A naive way to find the inverse is to generate a system of equations and solve it using Sage
modulo solve – solve mod(). Given the secret key
f = c0 + c1x+ c2x
2 + . . .+ cn−1xn−1 ,
suppose
f−1 = s0 + s1x+ s2x2 + . . .+ sn−1xn−1 .
We have
f · f−1 = 1 ∈ Rq .
This gives us
c0s0 − c1sn−1 − c2sn−2 − . . .− cn−1s1 ≡ 1 (mod q)
c0s1 + c1s0 − c2sn−1 − c3sn−2 − . . .− cn−1s2 ≡ 0 (mod q)
c0s2 + c1s1 + c2s0 − c3sn−1 − c4sn−2 − . . .− cn−1s3 ≡ 0 (mod q)
. . .
c0sn−1 + c1sn−2 + . . .+ cn−1s0 ≡ 0 (mod q) .
Solving this system of equations modulo q gives us f−1. However, the time complexity of
this approach is very inefficient. Although the equations can be generated almost instantly,
it takes a very long time to solve the equations modulo q. A better approach is to use the
Extended Euclidean Algorithm.
Also, it is worth mentioning that in order to declare n variables dynamically at execu-
tion time, I needed to use a Python hashtable. The key of the hashtable is an integer in
{0, 1, . . . , n− 1}, while the value is a data type that represents actual variable. We can use
var() to convert a string to a variable and put it in the hashtable for later usage.
5.1.2 Using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm
It is well known that Extended Euclidean Algorithm can be used to find the inverse of a
number in Zq. For example, if we are trying to find the inverse of 11 in the ring Z29. First,
we apply the Euclidean Algorithm.
29 = 11 · 2 + 7
11 = 7 · 1 + 4
7 = 4 · 1 + 3
4 = 3 · 1 + 1
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Thus,
gcd(29, 11) = 1 .
Now we apply the Extended Euclidean Algorithm.
1 = [4]− 1 · [3]
= [4]− 1 · ([7]− 1 · [4])
= 2 · [4]− 1 · [7]
= 2 · ([11]− 1 · [7])− 1 · [7]
= 2 · [11]− 3 · [7]
= 2 · [11]− 3 · ([29]− 2 · [11])
= 8 · [11]− 3 · [29]
Therefore, we know the inverse of 11 in Z29 is 8 because
8 · 11 ≡ 1 (mod 29) .
The same process can be applied to a polynomial in the ring Rq. For example, let
f = x3 + 1 φ(x) = x4 + 1 q = 7 .
First, let’s apply the Euclidean Algorithm.
x4 + 1 = (x) · (x3 + 1) + (−x+ 1)
x3 + 1 = (−x2 − x− 1) · (−x+ 1) + 2
Note that when the reminder is any constant, not necessarily 1, we can stop the process. If
the reminder is co-prime to q, then there is an inverse for f ; otherwise, no inverse exists.
Next, let’s apply the Extended Euclidean Algorithm.
2 = [x3 + 1]− (−x2 − x− 1) · [−x+ 1]
= [x3 + 1]− (−x2 − x− 1) · ([x4 + 1]− (x) · [x3 + 1])
= (−x3 − x2 − x+ 1) · [x3 + 1] + (x2 + x+ 1) · [x4 + 1]
Since we know that
2 · 4 ≡ 1 (mod 7) ,
we have
2 · 4 = (−4x3 − 4x2 − 4x+ 4) · [x3 + 1] + (4x2 + 4x+ 4) · [x4 + 1] .
Thus,
(−4x3 − 4x2 − 4x+ 4) · [x3 + 1] = 1 ∈ Rq .
Therefore, the inverse of f is
f−1 = −4x3 − 4x2 − 4x+ 4 = 3x3 + 3x2 + 3x+ 4 ∈ Rq .
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The implementation of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm in Sage follows the same process
as demonstrated. However, implementing it in Sage is not the same as working it out in
paper. Since the only way we can handle the coefficients of the polynomials is the coeffs()
function that returns a list of numbers, it is a little tricky to develop a Sage function. More
details can be found in the Sage code package.
5.2 Encryption Scheme Implementation
The implementation of the basic scheme implementation exactly follows the process of the
basic scheme. Below are the key functions implemented:
• keygen(N,B, q)
− INPUT: N as in φ(x) = xN + 1; B such that arbitrary polynomials are sampled
as B-bounded; q prime as in Rq
− OUTPUT: secret key, public key, evaluation key in this order
− This function first randomly samples the variables needed, and applies Extended
Euclidean Algorithm to find the inverse of the polynomial f . Finally, it outputs
the keys generated, including the evaluation key, which is a list of polynomials.
• enc(N,B, q, h,m)
− INPUT: N as in φ(x) = xN + 1; B such that arbitrary polynomials are sampled
as B-bounded; q prime as in Rq; h as the public key; m as a message in {0, 1} to
be encrypted
− OUTPUT: the generated ciphertext
− This function first randomly samples the variables needed, and then it computes
and outputs the ciphertext.
• encBits(N,B, q, h,m)
− INPUT: N as in φ(x) = xN + 1; B such that arbitrary polynomials are sampled
as B-bounded; q prime as in Rq; h as the public key; m as a list of bits to be
encrypted
− OUTPUT: the generated ciphertexts for each bit in a list
− This function repeatedly calls enc() and append each result to a list. Then it
outputs the list.
• dec(N, q, f, c)
− INPUT: N as in φ(x) = xN + 1; q prime as in Rq; f as the secret key; c as the
ciphertext to be decrypted
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− OUTPUT: the original message
− This function simply applies the decryption process and outputs the decrypted
message.
• decBits(N, q, f, c)
− INPUT: N as in φ(x) = xN + 1; q prime as in Rq; h as the public key; m as a list
of ciphertexts to be decrypted
− OUTPUT: the original messages for each ciphertext in a list
− This function repeatedly calls dec() and append each result to a list. Then it
outputs the list.
• eval(γ, c1, c2, q, N)
− INPUT: γ as the evaluation key, which is a list of polynomials; c1 and c2 as
two ciphertexts to be homomorphically multiplied; q prime as in Rq; N as in
φ(x) = xN + 1;
− OUTPUT: the ciphertext for the product of two ciphertexts
− This function applies the relinearization process described earlier while multi-
plying two given ciphertexts, so that the generated ciphertext can be decrypted
directly using dec().
• FHE demo(f ′, g, N, q,m, s, e, fq)
− INPUT: f ′ and g as B-bounded polynomials required to generate the secret key
and the public key; N as in φ(x) = xN + 1; q prime as in Rq; m as a message in
{0, 1} to be encrypted; s and e as two B-bounded polynomials required for the
encryption process; fq is an optional variable for the inverse of the secret key (if
given, it will speed up the whole process.)
− OUTPUT: the ciphertext generated
− This function runs though the processes of key generation, encryption and de-
cryption. It prints out every detailed step of each computation. It also monitors
error growth.
• hMultiply(f, c1, c2, N, q)
− INPUT: f as the secret key; c1 and c2 as two ciphertexts to be homomorphically
multiplied; N as in φ(x) = xN + 1; q prime as in Rq;
− OUTPUT: the ciphertext generated
− This function first multiplies the two ciphertexts and then decrypts the result
while printing out every detailed step of each computation. It also monitors error
growth.
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• hAdd(f, c1, c2, N, q)
− INPUT: f as the secret key; c1 and c2 as two ciphertexts to be homomorphically
added; N as in φ(x) = xN + 1; q prime as in Rq;
− OUTPUT: the ciphertext generated
− This function first adds the two ciphertexts and then decrypts the result while
printing out every detailed step of each computation. It also monitors error
growth.
Figure 5 is a screen shot of the LTV scheme demonstration running in Sage.
5.3 Real-world Application
Besides the basic scheme, I also implemented several applications of the encryption scheme.
Consider the following case. We have a database in the cloud with every bit encrypted
with a secret key f . This database contains information for your recent transactions on a
bank account and this database contains has two columns: the first column contains the
categories for the transactions and the second column contains values of the transactions.
Suppose you want to see the total money you spent on gas. How can we realize this using
the LTV scheme?
5.3.1 Comparator
First, we need a comparator that takes two sequences of ciphertexts and returns a ciphertext
indicating whether they are exactly the same. Let
cX = XnXn−1 . . . X2X1Y0 cY = YnYn−1Y0 . . . Y2Y1 .
Then the ciphertext we need to compute is
ccomp = (Xn + Yn + 1)(Xn−1 + Yn−1 + 1) . . . (X0 + Y0 + 1) .
In order for ccomp to be 1, each of the (Xi + Yi + 1) must be 1, which means each (Xi + Yi)
must be 0. This guarantees that Xi = Yi. Below is the function implemented in Sage.
compare(a, b,N, q, γ)
− INPUT: a and b as the two lists of ciphertexts to be compared; N as in φ(x) = xN + 1;
q prime as in Rq; γ as the evaluation key
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− OUTPUT: the ciphertext generated indicating whether a and b are exactly the same
− This function compares two sequences of ciphertexts and tells us if these two sequences
are exactly the same. It uses relinearazation to simplify the decryption process.
5.3.2 Full Adder
The next thing we need is to add two integers represented in binary. To realize this, we need
to implement a full adder using addition (XOR) and multiplication (AND). A full adder
in this case takes in two ciphertexts a and b to be added and a carry-in ciphertext Cin; it
generates a ciphertext s for the sum and another ciphertext Cout for carry-out. Figure 6
shows a 1-bit full adder module.
If we analyze the truth table of a full adder, we get the following equations using a Karnaugh
map:
s = Cin + a+ b
and
Cout = ab+ bCin + aCin .
Note that addition here means XOR instead of OR.
However, here is another choice of the circuit for Cout.
Cout = ab+ bCin + aCin
= (a+ Cin)(a+ b)− a2
= (a+ Cin)(a+ b) + a
2
= (a+ Cin)(a+ b) + a
Although the second circuit takes fewer operations and fewer multiplications, it is difficult
to decide which circuit to use. Let’s assume that the wrap-around error term for every
ciphertext is the same value E. Then we can make a rough approximation that the result
error in the first circuit is 3E2 but the error in the second one is 4E2 + E. Both circuits
seem to have their advantage. A comprehensive discussion on which circuit to use needs
some future work.
Below is the implementation in Sage, which uses the first circuit.
fullAdder(a, b, Cin, N, q, γ)
− INPUT: a and b as the two ciphertexts to be added; Cin as the carry-in ciphertext; N
as in φ(x) = xN + 1; q prime as in Rq; γ as the evaluation key
− OUTPUT: two ciphertexts: one for the carry-out bit and the other for the sum bit
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− This function implements 1-bit Full Adder. It uses relinearazation to simplify the
decryption process.
The next thing we do is to repeatedly chain full adders to add tuples of bits. The implemen-
tation in sage is straightforward.
addBits(a, b,N, q, γ)
− INPUT: a and b as the two lists of ciphertexts to be added; N as in φ(x) = xN + 1; q
prime as in Rq; γ as the evaluation key
− OUTPUT: a list of ciphertexts representing the sum of the two sequences of bits
− This function repeatedly uses fullAdder() to add two bit sequences. It uses relinearaza-
tion to simplify the decryption process. Note that the result has the same length as
the inputs.
Figure 7 is a screen shot of the addBits() function running in Sage worksheet.
With compare() and addBits(), we can solve the database problem mentioned earlier. Suppose
the first column has ciphertext sequences from A1 to An indicating the categories, while the
second column has ciphertext sequences from B1 to Bn indicating the values. Given a specific
category C, we can find the value we need by computing
Si = compare(Ai, C) ·Bi
and adding them together
S = addBits(addBits(S1, S2), S3) . . .
5.3.3 Further Applications
Imagine a similar database where the second column stays the same but the first column be-
comes a column containing the time of the transactions. We want to see the total transaction
value from the most recent month. What should we do?
This requires us to find the larger/smaller value of two ciphertext sequences. One option is
to subtract two sequences of bits and look at the borrow-out ciphertext. If it’s 1, then the
minuend is smaller; otherwise, the minuend is bigger than or equal to the subtrahend. This
will work on positive signed integers in two’s complement and unsigned integers. Again,
from the truth table, we can use a Karnaugh map to see that
s = Bin + a+ b
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and
Bout = (Bin + b)(1 + a) + bBin .
From this, we have our Sage implementation:
subtracter(a, b, Bin, N, q, γ)
− INPUT: a as the ciphertext for the minuend and b as the ciphertext for the subtrahend;
Bin as the borrow-in ciphertext; N as in φ(x) = x
N + 1; q prime as in Rq; γ as the
evaluation key
− OUTPUT: two ciphertexts: one for the borrow-out bit and the other for the difference
bit
− This function implements the subtracter that works similar as full adder but for sub-
traction. It uses relinearazation to simplify the decryption process.
Next, if we apply subtracter() repeatedly, we can subtract two sequences of ciphertexts.
subBits(a, b,N, q, γ)
− INPUT: a as the ciphertext sequence for the minuend and b as the ciphertext sequence
for the subtrahend; N as in φ(x) = xN + 1; q prime as in Rq; γ as the evaluation key
− OUTPUT: a list of ciphertexts representing the difference of the two sequences
− This function repeatedly uses subtracter() to subtract one bit sequence from another.
It uses relinearazation to simplify the decryption process. Note that we can use this to
find the smaller ciphertext sequence by checking Bout, and if this is the only purpose,
we can eliminate the computation of the difference.
Now that we can find the smaller one of two given ciphertext sequences, we can find the
transactions from the most recent month. We can apply similar operations as the previous
case to compute the ciphertext sequence for the total value.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
This project presents a single-key version of the LTV scheme that is more accessible to
non-experts. We provide serious mathematical proofs and detailed explanations on some
implicit mathematical steps that were not addressed by the authors of the original scheme.
We also trace back to the NTRU cryptosystem, which the LTV scheme was based on, to
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see how it is related to our problem. In addition, this project includes a Sage package that
implements the basic scheme and some real applications such as an n-bit Adder. The Sage
code is attached in the appendix.
However, there are some topics that are interesting but we do not have enough time to
cover. One of the topics is how to implement the database problem defined in Section 5.3
more efficiently. Right now, we need to multiply the result from comparator by the value
in second column and add the product from each row altogether. This is obviously not
satisfactory. Suppose we have 1,000,000 rows in a large database, but we only want the sum
from approximately 100 certain rows. In the method described in this project, 99.99% of
the work is unnecessary. But since the bit indicating whether we should add the value is
masked, it is very hard to find a way around it. This is certainly very useful in practice.
Another topic will be to analyze the security of the LTV scheme. This project completely
skips the security part; therefore, it will be nice to have a future project to fill this gap. Some
more possible topics include an implementation of this scheme in a lower-level language
such as Java or C/C++, a research into how exactly the LTV scheme utilizes Gentry’s
bootstrapping scheme, an discussion of how to design the most efficient circuits for the LTV
scheme and an expansion of the current Sage package.
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Appendix
#########################################
# The LTV Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
# Sage Implementation
#########################################
# Developed for Major Qualifying Project
# WJM5200
# in
# WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INSTITITE
#########################################
# Author: Quanquan Ma
# Advisor: Professor William J. Martin
# Professor Berk Sunar
#########################################
from random import randint
R.<x> = QQ[’x’];
#
# This encryption scheme is a single-key
# version of the cryptosystem by Lopez-Alt,
# Tromer and Vaikuntanathan.
#
# It includes basic operations
# - keygen
# - enc
# - dec
# - eval
# and more advanced circuits
# - fullAdder
# - n-bit adder
# - subtractor
# - comparator.
# It also includes demonstrations that shows
# detailed steps of the process.
#
# Variables are named based on the original scheme
# - B for B-bounded polynomials
# - n for phi = x^n + 1
# - q for the modulus
# - f for the secret key
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# - h for the public key
# - gamma for the evaluation key
#
#
# Key generation
# returns (sk, pk, ek)
# where ek is a list of polynomials
#
def keygen(N, B, q):
fprime = sample(N, B)
g = sample(N, B)
f = 2 * fprime + 1
# find inverse of f mod q
fq = fastInverse(f, N, q)
if fq == 0:
print "f is not invertible mod q. Please pick another f’."
return
# computer public key h
fqg = 2 * fq * g
fqg = fqg.mod(x^N + 1)
h = modCoeffs(fqg, q)
# Compute the evaluation key
logq = floor(log(q, 2))
gamma_tau = []
s_tau = []
e_tau = []
for tau in range(logq+1):
s_tau.append(sample(N, B))
e_tau.append(sample(N, B))
res = h * s_tau[tau] + 2 * e_tau[tau] + f*2^tau
gamma_tau.append(modCoeffs(res.mod(x^N+1), q))
return f, h, gamma_tau
#
# Compare two lists of ciphertexts
# returns a ciphertext indicating whether the
# two inputs are the encryption of the same bit
#
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def compare(a, b, N, p, gamma):
result = 1
for ai, bi in zip(a, b):
result = eval(gamma, result, (ai + bi + 1), p, N)
return result
#
# Full adder where each input and output is encryption of a bit
# a, b for the two bits being added
# cin for carry-in bit
#
# returns (s, cout)
# where s is the sum and cout is the carry-out
# they are all ciphertexts
#
def fullAdder(a, b, cin, N, p, gamma):
s = modCoeffs(a + b + cin, p)
cout = eval(gamma, a, b, p, N) + eval(gamma, cin, b, p, N) + eval(gamma, a, cin, p, N)
modCoeffs(cout, p)
return s, cout
#
# Add to list of ciphertexts
# in this order [LSB, ..., MSB]
# returns a list of ciphertexts indicating the sum
# notice that we get a n-bit integer when adding two n-bit integers
# the overflow is ignored
#
def addBits(a, b, N, p, gamma):
result = []
s = 0
cin = 0
for ai, bi in zip(a, b):
s, cin = fullAdder(ai, bi, cin, N, p, gamma)
result.append(s)
return result
#
# Subtracter the works similar to a full adder but for subtraction
# subtract b from a and Bin is borrow-in
# returns (d, Bout) where d is the difference and Bout is borrow-out
#
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def subtracter(a, b, Bin, N, p, gamma):
d = modCoeffs(a + b + Bin, p)
Bout= eval(gamma, modCoeffs(Bin+b, p), modCoeffs(1+a, p), p, N) + eval(gamma, Bin, b, p, N)
modCoeffs(Bout, p)
return d, Bout
#
# Subtract a list of ciphertexts from another list of ciphertexts
# a, b are the two lists of ciphertexts
# returns (result, Bin) where result is the difference of the two inputs and
# Bin can be use to find which of the two inputs is larger
#
def subBits(a, b, N, p, gamma):
result = []
s = 0
Bin = 0
for ai, bi in zip(a, b):
s, Bin = subtracter(ai, bi, Bin, N, p, gamma)
result.append(s)
return result, Bin
#
# multiply two polynomials in the ring R_q
#
def multiply(f, g, N, p):
return modCoeffs(cProduct(f, g, N), p)
#
# multiply two polynomials in the ring R
#
def cProduct(f, g, N):
return (f * g).mod(x^N + 1)
#
# Reduce the coefficients of a polynomial to modulo p
# notice that we reduce it into [-p/2, p/2]
#
def modCoeffs(f, p):
i = 0
f_mod_p = 0
for c in f.coeffs():
c = c % p
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if c > p / 2:
c -= p
f_mod_p += c*x^i
i += 1
return f_mod_p
#
# Sage does not support degree() on integers
# This is a way around it
#
def degree(a):
if a == 0:
return 0
a = a * x
return a.degree() - 1
#
# Reduce the coefficients of f modulo p regularly
# (into [0, p-1])
#
def modCoeffsPositive(f, p):
i = 0
f_mod_p = 0
for c in f.coeffs():
c = c % p
f_mod_p += c*x^i
i += 1
return f_mod_p
#
# Find the inverse of a polynomial using Extended Euclidean Algorithm
#
def fastInverse(f, n, p):
a, b = euclid(x^n+1, f, p)
return modCoeffsPositive(b, p)
#
# Extended Euclidean Algorithm in the ring R_q
#
def euclid(f, g, p):
q = []
r = []
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condition = True
while condition:
qi, ri = wellDivide(f, g, p)
f = g
g = ri
q.append(qi)
r.append(ri)
condition = not (degree(g) == 0)
# f = q_0 * g + r_0
# g = q_1 * r_0 + r_1
# r_n-2 = q_n * r_n-1 + r_n
#
# r_n = r_n-2 - q_n * r_n-1
n = len(q) - 1
# r_n = a * r_n-2 + b * r_n-1
# r_n-1 = r_n-3 - q_n-1 * r_n-2
# so
# r_n = b * r_n-3 + (a - b * q_n-1) * r_n-2
a = 1
b = -q[n]
while n >= 1:
tmp = b
b = a - b * q[n-1]
a = tmp
n -= 1
var(’t’);
k = int(solve_mod(ri*t==1, p, True)[0][t])
return a*k, b*k
#
# Devide two polynomials
# used for Extended Euclidean Algorithm
# returns a quotient and a reminder
# where f = g*res +rem
def wellDivide(f, g, p):
res, rem = divide(f, g, p)
curRem = rem
while degree(curRem) >= degree(g):
res2, curRem = divide(curRem, g, p)
res += res2
rem = curRem
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return res, rem
#
# A function that divides two polynomials but does not guarantee
# that the remainder is smaller than g
# used for wellDivide
# returns res as a polynomial x^n where n is the difference between
# f and g; rem as a polynomial the makes sure f = g*res +rem
#
def divide(f, g, p):
# assume f >= g
quo = x^(degree(f) - degree(g))
a = f.coeffs()[degree(f)]
b = g.coeffs()[degree(g)]
var(’t’);
sol = solve_mod(b*t==a, p, True)[0][t]
res = int(sol) * quo
rem = modCoeffsPositive(f - g * res, p)
return res, rem
#
# Find a inverse of a polynomial via solving a system of equations
# Very slow as the variables get large
# Better way is to use fastInverse()
#
def inverse(f, N, p):
# dynamically declare vars
a = {}
for i in range(N):
variable = "a" + str(i)
a[i] = var(variable)
# coeff list c0 ... cn
c = f.coeffs()
# generate a list of eqns to solve
eqns = []
for k in range(N):
left = 0
for i in range(N):
j = 0
for cj in c:
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if (i + j) % N == k:
if (i + j) < N:
left += cj * a[i]
else:
left -= cj * a[i]
j += 1
if k == 0:
eqn = left == 1
else:
eqn = left == 0
eqns.append(eqn)
print "Equations generated..."
print eqns
# modulo solve mod p
sln = solve_mod(eqns, p)
print "Solved..."
# the inverse might not exist, return 0 because 0 can never a an inverse
if len(sln) == 0:
return 0
else:
fp = 0
i = 0
for c in sln[0]:
fp += int(c)*x^i
i += 1
return fp
#
# Generate a random B-Bounded polynomial using random numbers from sage
# if we want to define a distribution chi, here is where to modify
#
def sample(N, B):
s = 0
for i in range(N):
r = randint(-B, B)
s += r * x^i
return s
#
# Encryption
49
# returns a ciphertext as an encryption of m
#
def enc(N, B, q, h, m):
s = sample(N, B)
e = sample(N, B)
c = cProduct(h, s, N) + 2 * e + m
c = modCoeffs(c, q)
return c
#
# Encrypt a list of messages
# returns a list of ciphertext
#
def encBits(N, B, q, h, m):
result = []
for mi in m:
s = sample(N, B)
e = sample(N, B)
c = cProduct(h, s, N) + 2 * e + mi
c = modCoeffs(c, q)
result.append(c)
return result
#
# Decryption
# returns a message which is actually a polynomial
# But if the decryption is correct, it returns a single bit because
# the other terms are all zero
#
def dec(N, B, q, f, c):
miu = multiply(f, c, N, q)
m2 = modCoeffs(miu, 2)
return m2
#
# Decrypt a list of bits
#
def decBits(N, B, q, f, c):
result = []
for ci in c:
m2 = dec(N, B, q, f, ci)
result.append(m2)
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return result
#
# Evaluation Process
# This is used to multiply c1 and c2 using a eval key gamma.
# returns a evaluated ciphertext as the result
#
def eval(gamma, c1, c2, q, N):
logq = floor(log(q, 2))
ctil = multiply(c1, c2, N, q)
c0tau = []
for tau in range(logq+1):
c0tau.append(0)
for tau in range(logq+1):
i = 0
if degree(ctil) != 0:
for c in ctil.coeffs():
if (c >= 0):
c0tau[tau] += (c % 2) * x^i
ctil -= (c % 2) * x^i
i += 1
else:
c0tau[tau] -= (c % 2) * x^i
ctil += (c % 2) * x^i
i += 1
ctil = ctil / 2
c1til = 0
for tau in range(logq+1):
c1til += gamma[tau] * c0tau[tau]
return modCoeffs(c1til.mod(x^N+1), q)
#
# A demo for modulus reduction
#
def FHE_modred_demo(ddec, u, g, N, q, B, m, s, e):
print "####################"
print "# Key generation:"
print "####################"
f = []
fq = []
h = []
for i in range(ddec):
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# compute secret key f
print "Iteration " + str(i) + ":"
f.append(2*u[i]+1)
print "Secret key: f_" + str(i) + " = " + str(f)
# find inverse of f_i mod q_i
fqi = fastInverse(f[i], N, q[i])
if fqi == 0:
print "f is not invertible mod q. Please pick another u."
return
else:
print "Inverse of f_" + str(i) + " is " + str(fqi)
fq.append(fqi)
# computer public key h
hi = 2 * g[i] * fq[i]
hi = hi.mod(x^N+1)
hi = modCoeffs(hi, q[i])
h.append(hi)
print "Public key: h = " + str(hi)
gamma = []
zeta = []
gamma.append([])
zeta.append([])
for fakei in range(ddec-1):
i = fakei + 1
# Compute the evaluation key
print "\nEvaluation Key:\n"
logqi = floor(log(q[i-1], 2))
gamma_tau = []
zeta_tau = []
s_tau = []
e_tau = []
for tau in range(logqi+1):
s_tau.append(sample(N, B))
print "s_" + str(tau) + " = " + str(s_tau[tau])
e_tau.append(sample(N, B))
print "e_" + str(tau) + " = " + str(e_tau[tau])
g_res = h[i] * s_tau[tau] + 2 * e_tau[tau] + f[i-1]*(2^tau)
z_res = h[i] * s_tau[tau] + 2 * e_tau[tau] + (f[i-1]^2)*(2^tau)
gamma_tau.append(modCoeffs(g_res.mod(x^N+1), q[i-1]))
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zeta_tau.append(modCoeffs(z_res.mod(x^N+1), q[i-1]))
print "gamma_" + str(tau) + " = " + str(gamma_tau[tau])
print "zeta_" + str(tau) + " = " + str(zeta_tau[tau])
gamma.append(gamma_tau)
zeta.append(zeta_tau)
print ""
print "###############"
print "# Encryption:"
print "###############"
print "Encrypted message: c = h[0] * s + 2 * e + m"
c = cProduct(h[0], s, N) + 2 * e + m
print " = " + str(c) + " (mod q0)"
c = modCoeffs(c, q[0])
print " = " + str(c)
print ""
print "###############"
print "# Decryption:"
print "###############"
print "First compute: miu = f * c (mod q)"
miu = f[0] * c
print " = " + str(miu) + " (mod x^N+1) (mod q)"
miu = miu.mod(x^N+1)
print " = " + str(miu) + " (mod q)"
miu = modCoeffs(miu, q[0])
print " = " + str(miu)
print "Recover message: m’ = miu (mod 2)"
m2 = modCoeffs(miu, 2)
print " = " + str(m2)
return c, gamma, zeta
#
# A demo for addtion in modulus reduction
#
def eval_add_demo(gamma, c1, c2, q, j ,N):
logq = floor(log(q[j], 2))
ctil = modCoeffs((c1+c2).mod(x^N+1), q[j])
print "c0~ = " + str(ctil)
c0tau = []
for tau in range(logq+1):
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c0tau.append(0)
print "Binary Representation:"
for tau in range(logq+1):
i = 0
for c in ctil.coeffs():
if (c >= 0):
#print str(c) + " pos=> " + str(c % 2)
c0tau[tau] += (c % 2) * x^i
ctil -= (c % 2) * x^i
i += 1
else:
#print str(c) + " neg=> " + str(c % 2)
c0tau[tau] -= (c % 2) * x^i
ctil += (c % 2) * x^i
i += 1
ctil = ctil / 2
print "c~(0," + str(tau) + ") = " + str(c0tau[tau])
c1til = 0
for tau in range(logq+1):
c1til += gamma[j+1][tau] * c0tau[tau]
c1til = modCoeffs(c1til.mod(x^N+1), q[j])
print "c1~ = " + str(c1til)
cadd = 0
i = 0
for c in c1til.coeffs():
cnew = c*q[j+1]/q[j]
cround = round(cnew)
# preserve the parity
if (cround + c) % 2 == 1:
if (cround - cnew) > 0:
cround -= 1
else :
cround += 1
cadd += cround * x^i
i += 1
cadd = modCoeffs(cadd.mod(x^N+1), q[j+1])
print "c_add = " + str(cadd)
return cadd
#
# A demo for multiplication in modulus reduction
#
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def eval_mul_demo(zeta, c1, c2, q, j ,N):
logq = floor(log(q[j], 2))
ctil = modCoeffs((c1*c2).mod(x^N+1), q[j])
print "c0~ = " + str(ctil)
c0tau = []
for tau in range(logq+1):
c0tau.append(0)
print "Binary Representation:"
for tau in range(logq+1):
i = 0
for c in ctil.coeffs():
if (c >= 0):
#print str(c) + " pos=> " + str(c % 2)
c0tau[tau] += (c % 2) * x^i
ctil -= (c % 2) * x^i
i += 1
else:
#print str(c) + " neg=> " + str(c % 2)
c0tau[tau] -= (c % 2) * x^i
ctil += (c % 2) * x^i
i += 1
ctil = ctil / 2
print "c~(0," + str(tau) + ") = " + str(c0tau[tau])
c1til = 0
for tau in range(logq+1):
c1til += zeta[j][tau] * c0tau[tau]
cadd = 0
i = 0
for c in c1til.coeffs():
cnew = c*q[j+1]/q[j]
cround = round(cnew)
# preserve the parity
if (cround + c) % 2 == 1:
if (cround - cnew) > 0:
cround -= 1
else :
cround += 1
cadd += cround * x^i
i += 1
return modCoeffs(c1til.mod(x^N+1), q[j+1])
#
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# A demo for the basic scheme
#
def FHE_demo(fprime, g, N, q, m, s, e, fq):
print "####################"
print "# Key generation:"
print "####################"
f = 2 * fprime + 1
print "Secret key: f = " + str(f)
# find inverse of f mod q
if fq == 0:
fq = inverse(f, N, q)
if fq == 0:
print "f is not invertible mod q. Please pick another f’."
return
else:
print "Fq = " + str(fq)
print "Verify: f * Fq = " + str(f * fq)
ffq = cProduct(f, fq, N)
print " (mod x^N+1) = " + str(ffq)
print " (mod q) = " + str(modCoeffs(ffq, q))
# computer public key h
print "Public key: h = 2 * Fq * g (mod q)"
fqg = 2 * fq * g
print " = " + str(fqg) + " (mod x^N-1) (mod q)"
fqg = fqg.mod(x^N + 1)
print " = " + str(fqg) + " (mod q)"
h = modCoeffs(fqg, q)
print " = " + str(h)
print ""
print "###############"
print "# Encryption:"
print "###############"
print "Encrypted message: c = h * s + 2 * e + m"
c = cProduct(h, s, N) + 2 * e + m
print " = " + str(c) + " (mod q)"
c = modCoeffs(c, q)
print " = " + str(c)
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print ""
print "###############"
print "# Decryption:"
print "###############"
print "First compute: miu = f * c (mod q)"
miu = f * c
print " = " + str(miu) + " (mod x^N+1) (mod q)"
miu = miu.mod(x^N+1)
print " = " + str(miu) + " (mod q)"
miu = modCoeffs(miu, q)
print " = " + str(miu)
print "fc before mod q"
gs = cProduct(g, s, N)
print "gs = " + str(gs)
fe = cProduct(f, e, N)
print "fe = " + str(fe)
fm = cProduct(f, m, N)
print "fm = " + str(fm)
fc = 2 * gs + 2 * fe + fm
print "fc = " + str(fc)
print "Recover message: m’ = miu (mod 2)"
m2 = modCoeffs(miu, 2)
print " = " + str(m2)
return c
#
# A demo for multiplying to ciphertexts in the basic scheme
#
def hMultiply(f, c1, c2, n, q):
print "\n##################"
print "# Multiplication"
print "##################"
ff = modCoeffs(cProduct(f, f, n), q)
print "f^2 = " + str(ff)
c1c2 = modCoeffs(cProduct(c1, c2, n), q)
print "c1c2 = " + str(c1c2)
ffc1c2 = modCoeffs(cProduct(ff, c1c2, n), q)
print "ff(c1c2) = " + str(ffc1c2)
result = modCoeffs(ffc1c2, 2)
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print " (mod 2) = " + str(result)
return result
#
# A demo for adding to ciphertexts in the basic scheme
#
def hAdd(f, c1, c2, n, q):
print "\n############"
print "# Addition"
print "############"
c1c2 = modCoeffs(c1 + c2, q)
print "c1 + c2 = " + str(c1c2)
fc1c2 = modCoeffs(cProduct(f, c1c2, n), q)
print "f(c1 + c2) = " + str(fc1c2)
result = modCoeffs(fc1c2, 2)
print " (mod 2) = " + str(result)
return result
58
Figure 5: The LTV Scheme demonstration in Sage
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Figure 6: 1-bit full adder
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Figure 7: 3-bit Adder in Sage
61
